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Abstract:
 
This paper describes British efforts to map the Russian influenza outbreaks of the early 
1890s and describe the timing and course of the epidemic waves. Drawing on two 
surveys conducted by Britain’s Local Government Board (LGB), the paper shows how, in 
a pre-virological era, the board was able to establish that influenza was an intensely 
infectious disease. Its key observation, however, was that Russian influenza had taken the 
form of three, and possibly four, distinct waves of infection, with the second wave in the 
spring of 1891 proving more lethal than the first wave, and the third wave in the winter of 
1892 proving almost as lethal again. Most of this mortality was due to excess deaths from 
respiratory disease, particularly in the middle age ranges, but while these insights could 
and, arguably, should have aided the public health response, British health authorities 
preferred to advocate cautious preventive measures that did little to alleviate the 
pandemic’s impact. The policy would prove especially costly in 1918-19 when the LGB 
missed the opportunity to provide extra nursing cover for influenza convalescents 
following the initial summer wave of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic.  
2The ‘Russian’ Influenza in the UK: lessons learned, opportunities 
missed.
On January 11, 1890, a letter appeared in the correspondence column of the British 
Medical Journal titled ‘The Influenza Epidemic: Requests for Information’. The 
epidemic in question was the ‘Russian’ influenza – so-called because the first mass 
outbreak had occurred in St Petersburg the previous autumn.  The disease had already 
sickened the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, and sparked mass absenteeism in the 
General Post Office’s Telegraphic Department, the center of communications of the 
British Empire. Now, as the influenza spread from London to Birmingham and Liverpool, 
threatening the heart of British manufacturing, the Medical Department of the Local 
Government Board (LGB) decided to invite readers of the BMJ to help it map the 
epidemic. The letter asked when readers first noticed cases of influenza ‘presenting 
distinctive characters’ in their district, whether they thought that the disease had been 
imported from ‘abroad…or in the case of institutions, from outside’, and whether they 
had been able to ascertain the incubation period [1].
 Although the Medical Department had previously conducted investigations into 
typhoid, smallpox and diphtheria, these investigations had been localized and limited in 
scope. The LGB’s report on the Russian influenza, however, mobilized the entire public 
health system, taking advantage of London’s position at the centre of the telegraphic and 
railroad networks to ensure that the department’s epidemiological gaze moved with the 
epidemic [2]. It was the first time the LGB had attempted to track influenza in real time, 
and within a week, the LGB had circulated detailed questionnaires about the etiology of 
influenza, its route of transmission, and its incubation period to Medical Officers of 
3Table 1. Questionnaire circulated by George Buchanan, Medical Officer of Health of Local 
Government Board [4].
Supplemented by investigations by the board’s own epidemiologists and bacteriologists, 
these questionnaires would form the backbone of one of the most comprehensive surveys 
ever conducted into an influenza pandemic [5]. Overseen by H. Franklin Parsons, the 
chief investigator of the LGB’s Medical Department, the report, together with an equally 
4detailed survey of the 1891-92 pandemic waves, would have huge implications for the 
management of future influenza outbreaks [6].
Parsons’ first and perhaps most significant finding was that influenza was almost 
certainly infectious and spread no faster than the most rapid form of human 
communication [7].  Second, Parsons demonstrated that while the onset of the first wave 
had been sudden, with deaths from influenza peaking on January 18, 1890, just three 
weeks into the six-week epidemic, thereafter mortality had rapidly declined. By contrast, 
the onset of the second wave, in May – June 1891, had been more gradual and protracted, 
with an eight-week average duration in London, but in the end had proved more lethal. 
This pattern of gradual onset coupled with mortality in excess of the first wave was also a 
feature of the third wave in January – February 1892 (in total, 624 deaths were ascribed 
to influenza in London in 1890, 2, 336 in 1891, and 2, 264 in 1892) [8].Thirdly, the 
LGB’s investigations showed that the pandemic had been particularly fatal to patients 
with underlying lung conditions, escalating the death rate from respiratory diseases such 
as pneumonia - a pattern that would be repeated in the 1899-1900 epidemic [9]. (Table 2.)
5Table 2. Annual death rate from influenza and pneumonia in England and Wales,  
 1890-1915 [9].
The result was that while the official returns for England and Wales recorded  
4,573 influenza deaths in 1890, 16,686 in 1891, and 15,737 in 1892, once excess deaths 
from respiratory diseases were included in the total, the Registrar General calculated the 
true death toll in 1890, 1891, and 1892 as, respectively, 27,074, 57,980, and 25,000 [10]. 
Taking into the account the fourth wave of influenza in 1893, the Registrar General 
calculated that the aggregate losses due to the Russian influenza pandemic in 1890-93 as  
‘not fewer than 125,000 lives’ [11]. Finally, Parsons concluded that many patients 
exhibited mild symptoms such that rather than being too sick to go out they continued to 
be ‘capable of conveying infection’ [12]. The finding was to have important implications 
for the future management of influenza pandemics, particularly the question of isolating 
patients in mild or asymptomatic cases.
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6The LGB was not alone in documenting the impact of the Russian influenza 
pandemic in the United Kingdom. Unlike the previous 1847-48 pandemic, the Russian 
outbreak coincided with a ‘golden age’ for Victorian newspapers, meaning that it was one 
of the best-reported pandemics in history [13]. Taking advantage of London’s position at 
the center of the worldwide telegraphic network, Reuters correspondents aimed to file 
reports from affected European capitals within 24 hours of an outbreak’s occurrence, 
while papers such as The Times employed correspondents to compete with the Reuters 
dispatches [14]. The fact that the earliest casualties included aristocrats like Lord 
Salisbury was unsettling to Victorians convinced of the superiority of British sanitary 
reforms. Since the mid-1860s, such reforms had protected London from cholera 
outbreaks that had decimated other European cities, but as the Russian influenza spread 
from St Petersburg, a city sneeringly referred to by The Times as ‘the most insalubrious of 
European capitals’, to Paris with a rapidity that seemed to outstrip more prosaic 
contagions, the superiority of a country’s sanitary arrangements appeared to make little 
difference [15]. Despite appeals in the medical press for newspapers to keep the threat in 
perspective and not to foster ‘dread’ of the epidemic through ‘sensational telegrams’, the 
pandemic appears to have sparked hysteria in London, particularly among male patients 
[16]. At St Bartholomew’s Hospital in Smithfield and the Royal Free Hospital in the 
Grays Inn Road, for instance, Samuel West, a specialist in respiratory disease, described 
how he had been astonished to arrive at morning surgery to find more than 1,000 patients 
– the majority of them men – ‘clamouring for treatment’ [17].
Although influenza was not a notifiable disease in 1890, based on staff absentee 
levels at the Post Office (32%) and the Bank of England (20.8%), Parsons estimated that 
about a quarter of London’s population had been affected. This was low compared to St 
Petersburg where it was estimated half the population were affected, and Vienna where 
the figure was 30-40% [18]. London also suffered significantly lower mortality than other 
European capitals, with the death rate, expressed as fatalities per 1,000 of population, 
peaking at 33 per 1,000 during the first week of January 1890, compared to 62 per 1,000 
in Paris [19].  Employees at public institutions and large private establishments were  the 
7most heavily impacted, with the Telegraphic Department in St Martin’s Le Grand 
suffering absentee rates as high as 38% [20]. Railway services were also disrupted, with 
three times as many engine drivers absent due to illness as in previous years [21]. 
 In an era when epidemiological thinking was dominated by miasmatic theories, 
the rapid progression of the influenza across Europe suggested that the epidemic might be 
due to supra-terrestrial influences linked to meteorological factors or fluctuations in the 
upper atmosphere. However, such theories could not explain why isolated communities 
such as lighthouses, jails, and monasteries, which were presumably exposed to the same 
occult influences, escaped the epidemic or why the influenza appeared to attack cities and 
densely populated urban centers close to railways and roads before spreading to rural 
areas. As Parsons recognized, getting the answer right was crucial, as miasma and 
contagion theories presupposed very different preventive strategies.
In all, some 1,150 questionnaires were returned to the LGB. Parsons also 
conducted extensive inquiries at zoos and stables to establish whether the epidemic was 
related to outbreaks of ‘pink-eye’, a form of equine influenza that had been observed in 
western England in the early autumn of 1889 [22]. His reports were a model of case-
tracking epidemiology, demonstrating that far from the epidemics having erupted 
simultaneously in several locations, as miasma theory predicted, each wave of the 
pandemic had been preceded by scattered cases that had increased incrementally over a 
number of weeks. The spread had followed a clear urban hierarchy, with London and 
other major urban centers generally being attacked first and smaller towns and rural areas 
following  several days or even weeks later [23]. Male breadwinners and schoolchildren 
were usually the first to contract influenza, Parsons observed, while their wives only 
became infected after the disease had been introduced to the household [24]. Likewise, 
MOsH in counties south and north of London found that the first cases could be often be 
traced to businessmen who travelled regularly to and from the capital for work [25]. 
Analysis of institutional outbreaks suggested that crowded, confined spaces were 
particularly favourable to the spread of influenza. For instance, Parsons observed that the 
infection rates of telegraph operators, who worked side by side-by-side in long galleries, 
8had been 10-20 times higher than those of ancillary staff [26]. However, the best 
demonstration of influenza’s infectiousness came in the spring of 1891 when railway 
officials traveled from Sheffield to Westminster to give evidence before a parliamentary 
committee. Within days of their appearance, more than 70 MPs and Lords had contracted 
influenza, including the Liberal leader William Gladstone. Just days prior to the outbreak 
in Westminster, the Sheffield papers had noted a greater number of deaths due to 
influenza [27].  When Parsons asked Sheffield’s medical officer to send him the mortality 
returns, he found that a graph plotting the rise and fall in mortality closely resembled the 
January 1890 epidemic in London. In Sheffield, however, the mortality had been far more 
pronounced, peaking at 73.4 per 1,000 in the first week of May 1891 – the highest rate 
ever recorded by the borough [28]. (Table 2).
Table 3. Second wave of ‘Russian’ influenza in Sheffield, 1891 [29].
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9Due to the growing body of evidence of influenza’s infectiousness, calls were 
soon being made for influenza to be designated a notifiable disease like cholera and 
smallpox. However, the LGB feared losing the good will of the medical profession by 
imposing yet another statutory duty on physicians. Moreover, Parsons’ inquiries had 
established an incubation period of between 2-3 days, leaving the authorities with very 
little time to take action in the event of an epidemic being notified [30]. The key 
observation, however, was that many patients exhibited such mild symptoms that they 
never came to the attention of doctors. This may explain why R Thorne Thorne, the 
Assistant Medical Officer, waited almost six months after the publication of Parsons’  
report to issue specific guidance on influenza [31]. No mention was made of compulsory 
notification. Instead, the board emphasized hygiene measures such as the ventilation of 
public buildings and the disinfection of sick rooms. It also called for influenza patients to 
avoid public gatherings and, where possible, to isolate themselves at home. The key 
advice, however, was to seek plenty of bed rest and to keep warm. The document also 
acknowledged that the main danger was the risk of respiratory complications. These risks 
had been apparent as early as January 1890, when London registered 2,258 deaths above 
the seasonal average, the majority of the excess being due to an increase in deaths from 
bronchitis, pneumonia, and phthisis (pulmonary tuberculosis) [32]. The third pandemic 
wave illustrated these risks, with London recording 5,012 ‘excess’ respiratory deaths 
between January and March 1892, nearly three times as many as from influenza alone 
[33].  Brighton also suffered unusually high mortality (60.9 per 1,000 in the week ending 
January 23, 1892), which the town’s MOsH, Arthur Newsholme, blamed on the high 
number of ‘chronic invalids, especially phthisical persons, and others with weak chests’ 
who chose to winter in the seaside resort to restore their health [34]. As a result, 
Newsholme supported the segregation of influenza patients from the rest of the 
population, especially those already suffering from or at risk of developing other 
respiratory diseases. ‘It is unsatisfactory that we are so comparatively helpless in the face 
of such an enemy’, he complained. Influenza was ‘intensely infectious’ and as such 
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patients suffering from influenza should be isolated as with any other infectious disease 
[35]. However, it took the death of Queen Victoria’s grandson, the Duke of Clarence, to 
convince the wider Victorian public of the importance of isolation efforts. Prince ‘Eddy’, 
as the Duke was popularly known, had contracted influenza early in the New Year during 
a shooting party, and on January 14, after a five-day battle with pneumonia, he was 
pronounced dead. He was just 28. The announcement sparked frenzied scenes in London, 
where large crowds had gathered to await news of the Duke’s health, and was followed 
by several days of national mourning [36].
For Parsons, these ‘low and insidious form[s] of pneumonia’ were a key feature of 
the influenza pandemic. If pneumonia was merely a secondary complication of influenza, 
‘and perhaps avoidable’, then it might be possible to guard against it by taking 
appropriate action.  This notion supported the board’s recommendation that influenza 
patients should  avoid exposure to the cold and get plenty of bed rest to guard against the 
danger of relapse [37]. Parsons also noted a marked shift in the average structure of 
mortality. During years when seasonal influenza is dominant, infants and the elderly 
accounted for the largest proportion of deaths. But in 1890, he noted, death had been 
more numerous in intermediate age groups, with the 20-40 age range accounting for 25% 
of the mortality, and the 40-60 age range 36%. The result was a marked leftward shift in 
the mortality curve [38]. (Table 3).  In  the subsequent 1918-19 influenza pandemic, of 
course, medics noted how middle age ranges had been targeted, though this was shifted to 
the even younger 20-40 age group [39].
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Table 4. Proportionate mortality from influenza in London by age, 1876-89 versus 
 first quarter 1890 [38].
Perhaps the most valuable lessons came from Parsons’ description of the epidemic 
waves and his observations that in England and Wales it was the second and third waves 
that had proved the most deadly [40].  Although the first wave had coincided with the 
winter of 1890, the Registrar General noted that the annual influenza death rate had been 
just 157 per million. By contrast, the death rate in 1891 had been 574 per million, even 
though the epidemic that year had coincided with the spring, a relatively clement time of 
year when the incidence of respiratory disease and mortality due to bronchitis and 
pneumonia were usually low. While the third wave in January 1892 had coincided with 
the winter months, much like the first wave, the influenza death rate in 1892 had been 
534 per million, almost as high as it was in 1891 [41]. These observations suggested that 
for all the morbidity associated with the initial wave of the pandemic, the later waves 
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were the ones that presented the greatest threat to survival, particularly in the case of 
patients with underlying health conditions. Such observations were not lost on students of 
historical epidemiology. In November 1918, for instance, Major Greenwood, an 
epidemiologist in the Ministry of Munitions, drew attention to the similarity between the 
quasi-symmetrical peak in mortality observed by Parsons in London in 1890 and the 
initial wave of the Spanish influenza in the summer of 1918. Arguing that there was an 
‘essential identity’ between the two curves, Greenwood predicted that the summer 1918 
wave most likely heralded a more severe secondary wave within twelve to fourteen 
months. The difference, Greenwood predicted, was that, unlike in 1891, the second wave 
would most likely coincide with the winter of 1919, suggesting that it would be advisable 
for the LGB to make provisions for increased nursing personnel and the removal of 
emergency cases to hospitals [42]. During this time, the secondary wave was already 
sweeping the British Isles, to be followed by a third and almost as deadly wave in March 
1919. The Chief Medical Officer of the LGB, however, chose to ignore the evidence, 
arguing that the war took precedence and that the military authorities could hardly be 
expected to countenance the diversion of doctors and nurses from the military Front to 
care for influenza convalescents [43]. Ironically, the name of that officer was Arthur 
Newsholme, the very same official who in 1892, as the medical officer for Brighton, had 
called for the isolation of influenza patients due to the risk they posed to the elderly and 
infirm.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the 1889-93 Russian influenza pandemic was the first 
epidemic in history to be tracked in real time. Using questionnaires and case reports, 
epidemiologists employed by Britain’s LGB mapped the spread of influenza and 
measured the frequency of attacks in an attempt to answer key questions about 
influenza’s etiology, its mode of transmission, and its interaction with respiratory 
illnesses. Through analysis of the raw mortality returns, the LGB’s investigators were 
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able to plot the behavior of the multiple waves of the epidemic and demonstrate how 
influenza had elevated the rate of mortality due to pneumonia and bronchitis. In 
particular, their investigations demonstrated that influenza was intensely infectious and 
that the secondary and tertiary waves were the most dangerous, regardless of the season. 
Unfortunately, due to the short incubation period of influenza and more pressing military 
priorities in 1918, these lessons were not applied during the Spanish influenza pandemic 
and thousands lost their lives due to avoidable causes.
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